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Abstract 
This study answers the question, how does China’s participation in United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations affect its military capability? To focus the 
research, this study examines the UN missions in Mali (MINUSMA) and South Sudan 
(UNMISS) to analyze the effects of China’s watershed decision to deploy infantry troops 
to these two countries. The impact of Chinese participation was assessed with 12 
measures of military capability. China’s strategic military resources (H1) and its ability to 
convert such resources into operational capability (H2) were found to be moderately 
affected by its peacekeeping participation. The study concludes that peacekeeping 
primarily affects five aspects of Chinese military capability: manpower, infrastructure, 
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Introduction 
 Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China” or 
“PRC”) has steadily increased the size and scope of its participation in United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Of the five permeant members of the UN 
Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), China is 
the largest contributor of troops at 2,545 soldiers− a contribution approximately double in 
number compared to the other members.1 In addition to personnel, China is also the 
second-largest funder of UN PKOs, contributing 15.2% of the total budget.2 Once a 
staunch non-interventionist that rebuked the liberal world order, China is showing 
considerable eagerness to join and expand the multinational organization leading many 
scholars to question, why the about-face?  
The following study will address the question, how does China’s participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations affect its military capability? The research will focus on the 
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to analyze China’s first infantry 
deployments. PRC military advancement will be evaluated using mixed methods content 
analysis and will be tested using 12 measures of military capability.  
Literature Review 
 In its first decade of UN membership (1971-1981), China abstained from all votes 
regarding peacekeeping operations. At the time, China perceived PKOs as a “thinly 
 
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China, 2020 (Washington, DC: Office of the Security of Defense, 2020). 
2 Louisa Blanchfield, “United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping,” Congressional 
Research Service, 2020. 
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veiled disguise for imperialist interventions by great powers.”3 Beijing largely 
maintained this attitude throughout the 1990s as it continued its foreign policy guided by 
the Principals of Coexistence.4 There was only one exception to its noninterference 
policy in 1992 when it sent 400 peacekeeping engineers to Cambodia. In the same year, a 
Chinese representative warned UN delegates that a vote to use “all necessary means” for 
military operations was “tantamount to writing a blank cheque…once military activities 
are in operation, the nature of the United Nations involvement will change.”5 The 
representative was largely correct in his prediction of UN missions, yet he did not foretell 
Beijing’s own rise within UN peacekeeping. 
 From 1999 to 2019, the number of UN peacekeeping operations with Chapter VII 
authority for military action rose from 4 to 12.6 Interestingly, China’s involvement in 
military-oriented missions also increased from 2 to 10 in the same time period. This 
revolution of behavior demonstrates Beijing’s now apparent multilateral focus in world 
affairs. The fundamental shift in policy, from “keeping a low profile” as to not upset the 
great powers, to a new “striving for achievement” model, is in large part due to President 
Xi Jinping’s vision for a “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.”7 Also termed the 
Chinese Dream, the Great Rejuvenation is China’s quest to become a great power itself. 
One of the most notable devolutions of “keeping a low profile” was China’s 
announcement in 2013 to deploy combat troops for the first time since the 1979 Chinese 
 
3 Christoph Zürcher, 30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping (Ottawa: China Policy Centre, University of 
Ottawa, 2019), 19. 
4 China’s five pillars of foreign policy became known as the Principals of Coexistence. The pillars were 1) 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) mutual nonaggression, 3) noninterference in each 
other’s internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence.  
5 Zürcher, 30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping, 23. 
6 Zürcher, 30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping, 24-28. 
7 Tom Bayes, China’s Growing Security Role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe 
(Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2020), 19. 
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incursion in Vietnam. Although China had deployed military medics and engineers to 
PKOs in the past, this was the first time it would send combat equipped and trained 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers to the front lines. Its first 170 infantry soldiers 
arrived at MINUSMA in 2013.8 This was soon followed by a 700-manned battalion to 
UNMISS in 2014.9 China’s expanding UN presence has long interested scholars but its 
recent uptick in overall military engagement has brought new focus to Beijing’s grand 
strategy. In an effort to explain their behavior, scholars have attempted to pinpoint 
Chinese intentions for deploying peacekeeping units. 
Why Sponsoring Countries Join PKOs 
 There are several reasons why nations contribute to the UN, not all of which 
apply to a developed country like China.10 The literature in this field largely relies on a 
realist interpretation of international relations, where states seek to gain material or social 
benefit from peacekeeping operations rather than an altruistic desire for peace and 
humanity. Scholarship identifies four major reasons why developed countries sponsor 
PKOs: 1) economic gain, 2) soft power accumulation, 3) identity management, and 4) 
military advancement.  
UN peacekeeping for economic purposes. Sponsoring countries may participate 
in PKOs to protect their economic interests from spoil. UN missions aim to stabilize 
conflict-ridden countries and regions, which bolsters economic production and the ability 
to transport goods. Passmore, Shannon, and Hart studied the economic benefits of 
 
8 China-Hai Huang, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: The People’s Republic of China,” Providing for 
Peacekeeping, April 2017, http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-
china/.  
9 Huang, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: The People’s Republic of China.”  
10 Xenia Avezov, “Why Contribute? Understanding Asian Motivations for Troop Contribution to Peace 
Operations,” Journal of International Peacekeeping 18, (2014): 263. 
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peacekeeping and found that a sponsoring country’s market investment in a recipient 
peacekeeping country is a statically significant factor for determining the sponsoring 
country’s level of troop contribution.11 In other words, the larger a country’s market 
investment, the higher number of troops they will contribute. When the sponsoring 
country has sunk costs in physical assets, it is more determined to resolve peace, even if it 
is by force. Thus, PKO participation can be driven by the sponsoring country’s domestic 
economic gain more so than peacekeeping itself.  
UN peacekeeping for soft power accumulation. Another theory why nations 
join peacekeeping is the accumulation of soft power. Soft power, originally described by 
Nye as a state’s ability to co-opt rather than coerce another nation’s behavior, can be 
amassed through participation in multilateral humanitarian missions.12 By participating in 
UN PKOs, nations demonstrate a dedication to conflict resolution and an ability to 
participate responsibly in the liberal world order. Datta’s quantitative study on soft power 
reveals that votes and collective decisions made within the UN can “bestow legitimacy” 
for the participating country.13 Particularly, she found that the United States’ foreign 
policy was perceived more legitimate when it coincided with UN decisions. The study 
shows that the United States co-opted nations to agree with their foreign policy by 
participating in the UN, rather than having to resort to coercion by other means. Thus, 
just by participating in PKOs, countries can accumulate legitimacy for their overall 
 
11 Timothy Passmore, Megan Shannon, and Andrew Hart, “Rallying the Troops: Collective Action and 
Self-Interest in UN Peacekeeping Contributions,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 3 (2018).  
12 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
13 Monti Narayan Datta, “The Decline of American Soft Power in the United Nations,” International 
Studies Perspectives 10, (2009): 281. 
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foreign policy in the region, whether or not their intentions are directly related to 
peacebuilding.14  
UN peacekeeping for identity management. In conjunction with legitimizing 
their soft power through UN PKOs, nations are also able to use peacekeeping missions to 
posture and indicate their international identity.15 Avezov writes that involvement in 
peacekeeping is a method of “singling political-military intentions, demonstrating 
international responsibility, or projecting military capabilities.”16 He finds this to be 
especially true of smaller participating countries that need a platform for their voice to be 
heard. Nevertheless, larger countries also find the UN a useful tool for identity projection. 
Through an examination of themes discussed at UN meetings, Avezov found that 
Japan uses UN peacekeeping as a way to identify as “a benign civilian power” dedicated 
to regional stability. In this case, Japan was found to be signaling to its Asian neighbors 
that it is a force for peace rather than conflict. South Korea also postured through UN 
peacekeeping by demonstrating its closeness with Western UN members as a 
countermeasure for the “potential of regime collapse in North Korea.”17 Thus, PKOs act 
as a mechanism to both posture with and against great powers, as well as indicate to the 
international community what they stand for. 
UN peacekeeping for military advancement. The final theory for why nations 
join peacekeeping is the desire to develop military capabilities. PKO missions offer 
 
 
15 China has notably postured its identity through the UN Human Rights Council. It pushed for the 
inclusion of infrastructure development in “the contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human 
rights” resolution, demonstrating that it defines human rights as economic and social rights, rather than the 
Western-oriented political and civil rights. 
16 Avezov, “Why Contribute? Understanding Asian Motivations for Troop Contribution to Peace 
Operations,” 263. 
17 Avezov, “Why Contribute? Understanding Asian Motivations for Troop Contribution to Peace 
Operations,” 276. 
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sponsoring nations the opportunity to experience combat in “inhospitable, remote and 
dangerous environments,” at least according to the UN.18 PKOs can offer sponsoring 
nations an opportunity to field soldiers and test equipment without going to war.19 They 
also offer the opportunity, as Harig finds, to drum up domestic politics for military 
development. 
 Harig’s study on the Brazilian army’s participation in the UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) found three concrete outcomes for the sponsoring 
country.20 First, Brazilian soldiers practiced and become comfortable with use of force 
missions, thus gaining a form of combat experience. Second, politicians were able to 
leverage PKO success as a reason to use Brazilian forces for domestic security issues, 
and third, military doctrine and training were developed to institutionalize the army’s 
new domestic role. For Brazil, MINUSTAH provided combat training to officers and 
helped form the political clout needed to develop their military apparatus without ever 
naming a foreign advisory. 
Analysts have speculated that China seeks similar military advancement from 
PKOs but there is little research to demonstrate this assumption. For example, Fung 
writes that “each peacekeeping mission presents unique potential training scenarios” for 
China but fails to demonstrate what they actually glean from the training.21 Cho’s study 
on multiple motivations for peacekeeping considers military advancement as one 
motivation for UN participation but stops short of actually studying China’s military.22 
 
18 United Nations, “Military,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed September 21, 2020, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/military 
19 Zürcher, 30 Years of Chinese Peacekeeping, 41. 
20 Christopher Harig, “Learning to Fight in UN Peacekeeping,” Defense Studies 20, no. 1 (2020): 39-60. 
21 Fung, “What Explains China’s Deployment to UN Peacekeeping Operations?” 
22 Cho, “China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations Since the 2000s.” 
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Others like Cabestan write off any military learning with the belief that China’s PKO 
involvement is purely “symbolic.”23 Missing from all the scholars’ claims is a clear 
explanation for how they define military learning and advancement, as well as data to 
prove that it is or is not happening.   
According to the 2020 U.S. Department of Defense assessment on the Chinese 
military, the PLA has gained “the most experience conducting PKO[s]."24 This indicates 
that they are indeed gaining experience, but academic research has yet to determine what 
kind of experience. Beijing also signals the importance of peacekeeping for military 
advancement through the structure of its defense strategy.  
Beginning in 2006, the PRC began dividing its defense strategy into two 
categories, war operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW).25 
According to China’s Academy of Military Science, MOOTW includes seven missions, 
one of which is international peacekeeping.26 Peacekeeping, therefore, is a codified 
strategy for Chinese defense and receives national defense resources to carry it out. 
However, past scholarship failed to contextualize China’s UN-related activities in the 
greater scheme of Chinese military power and thus dismissed the importance of military 
advancement even if it was minimal.  
Military advancement may not be the first or second reason why China joins 
PKOs but any advantage that Beijing garners from the missions is important to 
 
23 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Involvement in Africa’s Security: The Case of China’s Participation 
in the UN Mission to Stabilize Mali,” The China Quarterly 235, (2018): 725.  
24 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China, 2020. 
25 Fan Gauyue and James Char, Introduction to China’s Military Operations Other than War (Singapore: 
Nanyang Technological University, 2019). 
26 The other six MOOTW missions are 1) counterterrorism/anti-piracy, 2) stability maintenance, 3) disaster 
rescue and relief, 4) operations to safeguard sovereignty and national interests, 5) safety and security 
operations, and 6) overseas rescue and relief. 
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understanding China’s overall military capability. This study will add to this knowledge 
by clearly defining measures of military capability and focus on a single UN motivator, 
military advancement. The study will also add commentary on Beijing’s increasingly 
expeditionary foreign policy and how it relates to UN participation.  
Hypotheses 
 The study will use content analysis to examine what, if any, military advancement 
is effected by UN peacekeeping deployments. If China intends to use PKO’s to advance 
their military capability, an increase in PKO contributions should correspond to an 
increase in the strategic resources amassed for its defense apparatus: 
H1: Increases in Chinese PKO participation will increase the PLA’s strategic 
resources. 
 Additionally, if China intends to use PKO’s to advance their overall military readiness, 
there should be a corresponding increase in their ability to convert strategic resources into 
effective military operations: 
H2: Increases in Chinese PKO participation will increase the PLA’s conversion 
capability. 
The terms “strategic resources” and “conversion capability” are defined in the following 
section. 
  Methodology 
Data was assessed using mixed methods content analysis. The data collection for 
this study was limited to the UN missions in Mali (MINUSMA) and South Sudan 
(UNMISS) for three reasons. First, China’s infantry deployments to Mali and South 
Sudan represent a fundamental shift in Chinese peacekeeping policy, which historically 
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has avoided activity that could be perceived as military intervention. Second, MINUSMA 
and UNMISS have challenging and complex operational environments that offer 
opportunities for military advancement. Third, the richness of the literature on these two 
peacekeeping missions offers sufficient data for the scope of this study on military 
advancement.  
Data was gathered from query searches on MINUSMA and UNMISS and was 
prescreened for information about Chinese contribution or efforts. Data that did not 
contain a reference to Chinese UN participation, or did not contain novel information, 
was discarded from the dataset. After data collection was exhausted, meaning new 
information was undiscoverable, the content was inputted into the research software, 
Dedoose, to code for themes of military capability. The base code tree was based on 
RAND Corporations measurement system for military capability.27 
 Military capability was operationalized using RAND’s measurement system 
because of its broad and applicable categories that allowed for a nuanced examination 
into a subset of military capability such as peacekeeping. Military capability is split into 
two umbrella categories, strategic resources (H1) and conversion capability (H2). 
Strategic resources are defined as “the resources— financial, human, physical, and 
technological—that the national leadership makes available to its military organizations,” 
and contains six subcategories for analysis:28 
1. Defense Budget: The size of the budget and the changes over time. 
 
27 Ashley Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson, “Measuring Military 
Capability” in Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND Cooperation, 
2000). 
28 Tellis, Bially, Layne, and McPherson, “Measuring Military Capability,” 136. 
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2. Manpower: The number of military personnel and the education or technical 
capability of the soldiers. 
3. Military Infrastructure: The number and range of physical infrastructure (i.e. 
bases and installations). 
4. Combat Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (CRDT&E): The 
number and quality of facilities that research, develop, or test technology or 
military capability, to include academic institutions, research organizations, 
and technical centers. 
5. Defense Industrial Base: The number and quality of private firms and 
corporations that depend on defense spending and manufacture defense goods. 
6. Warfighting Inventory and Support: The number of arms, armament, vehicles, 
planes, ships, and other military holdings. 
Conversion capability is defined as the ability of a nation to convert strategic resources 
into effective combat operations (i.e. operational effectiveness). RAND enumerates five 
subcategories for analysis but due to the richness of data for the “Doctrine, Training, and 
Organization” category, this study splits the category into two, as described below: 
1. Threats and Strategy: Analysis of whether a nation’s means match its ends, or 
its strategy meets the operational demands of its perceived threats.  
2. Doctrine and Training: The principals for how a nation plans to fight and their 
training preparedness to use those required assets. 
3. Command and Control (Organization): The level of centralization or 
decentralization of command structures, the adaptability of command and 
control, and the internal connectivity of the organization. 
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4. Civil-Military Relations: The level of access that the military has to national 
leadership, and established hierarchy or norms for who will make decisions 
regarding force design, level of procurement, and level of employment. 
5. Foreign Military-to-Military Relations: Quantity and quality of foreign 
military relations, overseas training, military education exchanges, and 
combined exercises.  
6. Capacity for Innovation: An organization’s ability to cope with changing 
environments and threats, including adapting to warfighting concepts and 
technology advancement. 
After conducting content analysis and coding the data for themes of military 
capability as stated above, each subcategory was weighed for quantitative importance – 
the number of references in each bucket – and qualitative importance – the quality of the 
content. Based on this analysis, each subcategory was assigned a weighted rating for its 
effect on Chinese military capability – minimal/no effect (1 point), moderate (2 points), 
or significant (3 points). Minimal/no effect was defined as no effect or minimal data to 
determine that peacekeeping changed military capability. Moderate was defined as 
possible or some evidence that peacekeeping attributed to military capability, and 
significant was defined as absolute or near certainty that peacekeeping contributed to 
China’s military capability. The average point rating and accumulation of data was then 
analyzed per each umbrella category (H1: Strategic Resources and H2: Conversion 
Capability) and final significance was assigned for each hypothesis. 
Data  
 
  12 
 Data for this study included official data from the UN, Chinese government 
publications, U.S. government publications, academic journals and reports, and videos 
and reports by Chinese media (see Table 1). Select excerpts that demonstrate the findings 







Defense budget. The relationship between China’s defense budget and PKO 




29 Sources for “Official Government Publications” unless cited elsewhere in Data: "Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Hong Lei's Remarks on Death of Three Chinese Citizens in Malian Hostage-taking 
Incident," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 21, 2015, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1317097.shtml; The State 
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China's National Defense in the New Era 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd, 2019). 
30 Sources for “Academic Reports” unless cited elsewhere in Data: Marc Lanteigne, The Role of UN 
Peacekeeping in China's Expanding Strategic Interests (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
2018); Frans Paul van der Putten, China’s evolving role in Peacekeeping and African Security (The Hague: 
Clindendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2015); Helena Legarda, "Chinese 
Mercenaries are Tightening Security on the Belt and Road," Merics, October 19, 2018. 
31 Sources for “Media Reports” unless cited elsewhere in Data: Li Jiayao, "Chinese peacekeepers to Mali 
join in multinational rescue drill," China Military Online, January 3, 2020, 
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-01/03/content_9709297.htm; Chen Zhuo, "Chinese Peacekeeper: For 
Peace, I'm Ready to Fight," China Military Online, November 22, 2019; Huang Panyue, "Chinese 
Peacekeepers Return from South Sudan," Xinhuanet, March, 1, 2018, 
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-03/01/content_7955797.htm; Huang Paynue, "Malian Defense 
Minister meets with Chinese Military Delegation," China Military Online, August 16, 2016. 
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-08/16/content_7210210.htm; “Full 
text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 3, 2017, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm. 
Table 1. Data Summary  
Data Sources Total 
Official UN Publications 7 
Official Government Publications29 10 
Academic Reports30 17 
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difficult to assess changes in peacekeeping funding over time.32 Additionally, China 
reports large categories of defense expenditures. For example, in 2017 the PRC reported 
that of their total $1.4 billion defense budget, 41.1% went to equipment, 30.8% to 
personnel, and 28.1% to training and maintenance.33 This reporting style makes it 
impossible to assess how China spends its defense funding per branch, much less how it 
spends its budget per unit within the PLA.  
China does report how much it contributes to the UN, but it is unknown if these 
contributions are part of China’s overall defense budget. China contributed a total of 
$336 million to the UN in 2020 and its contributions made up 15.21% of UN 
peacekeeping missions.34 China also announced a $10.38 million donation for 
peacekeeping as part of its China-UN Peace and Development Fund, but it is unclear if 
this was part of their overall UN contribution or an additional donation.35 Thus the effect 
of peacekeeping on China’s military budget is largely indeterminable.  
Manpower. As of August 2020, China was the tenth largest contributor to 
MINUSMA and the seventh largest contributor to UNMISS (See Table 2). China’s 
MINUSMA contingent is reportedly comprised of infantry from China’s northeastern 
Shenyang region, which borders North Korea and Russia.36 The UNMISS contingent, 
 
32 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win 
(Washington, DC: DIA Military Power Publications, 2018). 
33 Li Jiayao, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s 
Republic of China, July 24, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2019-07/24/content_4846452.htm.  
34 Committee on Contributions, "Contributions Received for 2020 for the United Nations Regular Budget," 
General Assembly of the United Nations, September 30, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml; United Nations, "How Are We Funded," United 
Nations Peacekeeping, accessed on October 3, 2020, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded 
35 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China's Armed Forces: 30 
Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd, 2020). 
36 Lloyd Thrall, China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015). 
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Table 2. 2020 Chinese Troop Contributions by Mission37 
 
at least in 2012, was comprised of soldiers from PLA’s elite 162nd Motorized Infantry 
Division.38 Chinese peacekeeping troops go through three months of “basic, professional, 
tactical and comprehensive exercises” before their 12-month deployment.39 However, 
despite China’s personnel contributions, the UN reports unfilled troop requirements in 
each mission. MINUSMA and UNMISS have been understaffed by at least 500 troops 
since 2015, with some years yielding a delta of over 4,500 troops (see Figure 1).  
China appears to have the intention of filling some of the delta with its 2015 
pledge to raise 8,000 peacekeeping troops for a rapid response standby force.40 As of 
September 2020, seven of the 28 units in the rapid response force have passed the UN 
Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) Level 2, and six have passed PCRS 
Level 3. China’s State Council Information Office reports the PRC has the largest and 
most diverse standby peacekeeping force in the world.41 The 28 units consist of infantry, 
engineer, transport, medical, force protection, rapid response, helicopter, transport 
 
37 “Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations Peacekeeping, June 30, 2019, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.; United Nations Peacekeeping, "Mandate," 
MINUSMA, accessed on October 3, 2020, https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0.; United Nations 
Peacekeeping, "Mandate," UNMISS, accessed on October 3, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/mandate. 
38 Thrall, China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security. 
39 Li Wei, "6th Chinese Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion to South Sudan (Juba) Sets Out," China Military 
Online, November 20, 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-11/20/content_9679499.htm 
40 "China Is Here for Peace. Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China at the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Summit," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 
28, 2015. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1305410.shtml. 
41 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China's Armed Forces: 30 
Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations.  
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aircraft, UAV, and surface ship units. At the time of writing, there is no evidence that the 
rapid response force has been deployed to a UN mission. 
Interestingly, the announcement to raise 8,000 rapid response troops for 
peacekeeping came in the same year Xi Jinping called for an overall force reduction. In 
2015, President Xi Jinping announced a plan to cut the military by 300,000 personnel in 
order to modernize and develop strategic capabilities.42 The PLA would reorganize and 
focus efforts on special operations units that had multifunctionality. The difference 
 
Figure 1. UN Mandate Compared to Actual Troop Contribution43 
  
 
42 John Chen, “Choosing the ‘Least Bad Option’” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, ed. Phillip Saunders, 
Arthur Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew Yang, and Joel Wuthnow (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 2019). 
43 “Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations Peacekeeping, June 30, 2019, 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.; United Nations Peacekeeping, "Mandate," 
MINUSMA, accessed on October 3, 2020, https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/mandate-0.; United Nations 
Peacekeeping, "Mandate," UNMISS, accessed on October 3, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/mandate. 
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between PLA’s rapid response peacekeeping units and regular units “has mostly been 
dissolved,” according to the National Defense University, indicating that Chinese 
peacekeepers are the same critical special operations units that survived the force 
reduction.44   
Military infrastructure. Although only one foreign base is in operation, the 
opening of the 2017 Djibouti logistics base is a significant data point because it is 
China’s first overseas military base. One of the three reasons provided for the Djibouti 
base was peacekeeping operations: “The logistics center supports anti-piracy, UN 
peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief missions in both Africa and Western Asia.”45 
There is speculation of other naval bases underway, to include locations in the Gulf of 
Guinea and Walvis Bay, Namibia.46 Although an official announcement of these bases 
has not been made, the secretiveness of the negotiations in Djibouti and the surprise 
 
44 Chen, “Choosing the ‘Least Bad Option,’” 91. 
45 "Djibouti: Chinese Military’s First Overseas Support Base,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s 
Republic of China, April 23, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-04/23/content_4840097.htm. 
46 Tom Bayes, China’s Growing Security Role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe 
(Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2020). 
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among academics that it was a “complete military and naval base” rather than the 
downplayed “logistics facility,” warrants mention of these speculated installations.47    
Combat research, development, test, and evaluation. In 2009, the PRC created 
the Peacekeeping Affairs Center of the Ministry of National Defense located in Huairou, 
China. The center is built similarly to a UN base camp and includes a shooting range and 
driving track.48 Students simulate real-life scenarios on the installation, from planning to 
live-fire drills. From 2015 to 2020, China trained 1,500 peacekeepers from 60 
countries.49 They are in the process of expanding the Center to accept more international 
students.50 Additionally, China funded the AU African Centre for the Study and Research 
on Terrorism and works in close collaboration to develop AU military forces. 
The multilateral nature of peacekeeping provides China with the opportunity to 
also attend international peacekeeping institutions. Beijing celebrates the 100 PLA 
officers who have attended peacekeeping training in countries such as Argentina, 
Finland, and Germany.51 Notably, however, China does not help fund the international 
peacekeeping training centers in Mali or Ghana, preferring to make capital investments at 
its own facilities.52 
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Defense industrial base. Beijing supports its industrial base with foreign sales, 
but it is also wary of international consternation. For example, Beijing used its status in 
the UN Security Council to veto or abstain from voting on the resolutions for a South 
Sudanese arms embargo.53 Their lack of support was later explained when a Chinese 
corporation, Norinco, was caught selling arms to South Sudan People’s Defense Force 
(SPLA) in 2014. After a damaging UN report stating Chinese arms sales were 
"instrumental in prolonging and escalating the war," Beijing stated it would be 
“inappropriate” to continue with the deal.54 It should be noted that one academic study 
found that “arms exporting companies may be operating beyond the control of 
government” since the number of them “overwhelmed” Chinese regulating bodies.55 
Thus, it is possible the Chinese government was not directly linked to this sale in 2014.  
However, Beijing appears to have learned a lesson and has been cautious since the 
event in South Sudan. It has refrained from selling arms to Mali, instead choosing to 
donate non-lethal equipment like logistics trucks.56 Additionally, although China now 
makes up a quarter of all small arms sales to Africa, its sales do not heavily overlap with 
UN peacekeeping countries.57 Furthermore, China’s 2019 National Intelligence Law 
mandates all Chinese organizations and citizens “support, assist, and cooperate with state 
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intelligence work,” indicating that the defense industry is likely now in tune with PRC 
strategy.58 Thus, PKOs may very well have helped the government organize and enforce 
regulation for their defense industrial base. 
Warfighting inventory and support. Chinese troops are generally regarded as 
“well equipped” and routinely pass UN inventory inspection checks.59 The first troops 
sent to Mali in 2013 were adorned with “full body armor, night vision equipment, and 
newly released rifles.”60 A 2019 video displays soldiers performing a drill in Mali, 
handling heavy machine guns mounted to armored vehicles, and conducting target 
practice with standard-issue QBZ-95 rifles.61 In 2019, Chinese troops in South Sudan 
were praised as role models for their “first-class equipment management skills.”62 In 
addition to soldiers being well-equipped, there are reports that Chinese camps have high-
tech surveillance technology and their hospitals have state-of-the-art medical supplies.63  
The PRC also supports further technological advancement in UN PKOs. Beijing’s 
2020 white paper on peacekeeping calls for the “employment of advanced technology 
with a view to improving the effectiveness of the UNPKOs and fulfilling the role they are 
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expected to play.”64 The technology could mean transport aircraft, UAV, and surface ship 
units, which are part of China’s 8,000 rapid response force but are not yet readily used by 
UN missions. China has experience chartering its own emergency medical aircraft to 
evacuate two wounded soldiers from South Sudan in July 2016, which could be one 
factor driving the diversification and betterment of UN assets.65 
Conversion Capability  
Threats and strategy. There are multiple ways to examine China’s perceived 
threats and implemented strategies. One way is to look at the existential threat that 
China’s lack of operational experience poses to its military readiness. It appears that 
China’s participation in MINUSMA and UNMISS permits moderate logistics learning 
and some combat experience.  
In South Sudan, China increased the number of infantry troops from 341 to 1051 
from 2014 to 2015. This allowed China to deploy whole battalions to the combat 
environment, the first real battalion-sized deployment to a UN PKO.66 These 
deployments to UNMISS provide an opportunity for Chinese troops to work together in 
real operations and offset some of their experience deficit.  
UNMISS has provided soldiers with some combat opportunities as well. Beijing 
reports that Chinese peacekeepers faced a “raging storm of gunfire and artillery 
bombardment” to save the lives of 9,000 civilians in Juba in July 2016.67 In March 2017, 
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the PRC deployed 12 officers to Yei, South Sudan to serve as backup for UN troops 
caught in crossfire.  Overall, however, the effectiveness of China’s strategy to gain 
combat experience through PKOs is limited due to their overwhelming precaution (see 
Doctrine and Training section for more information). 
China has a greater opportunity to gain logistics experience, which is a critical 
skill for military operations far from home. While moving thousands of soldiers through 
PKOs each year, China acquires knowledge of “ports of debarkation, lines of 
communication, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local ‘atmospherics’ and 
modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged periods."68 In 
order to manage the Chinese UN camp in Mali, a Chinese cook describes the importance 
of shipping in Chinese ingredients to feed troops “a taste of home.”69 Logistics is also the 
reason cited for their base in Djibouti.70 Thus, PKOs give the  PLA practice using 
logistical and supply lines for deploying soldiers to faraway lands, and gain some combat 
experience. 
Another major threat to China is the endangerment of Chinese citizens living 
abroad. The threat was perceived so great in Mali and South Sudan that China sent not 
only enabler troops but also infantry troops. Their first infantry deployments to 
MINUSMA and UNMISS only carried out “guard duties” to protect Chinese enabler 
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troops and citizens.71 Their strategy to protect citizens with peacekeepers has not always 
been successful. 
In the 2015 terrorist attack in the Mali Radisson Blu Hotel, three PRC citizens 
were killed, and four PRC citizens had to be rescued. The Chinese peacekeepers, located 
in Gao, were too far away to respond to the capital city and so the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had to coordinate the rescue rather than the peacekeepers.72 In this 
particular example, China’s strategy to localize peacekeepers in Gao meant they were 
unable to respond to the threat posed against their citizens.  
China altered its tactics in Mali after this attack by connecting peacekeepers with 
the local embassy. This allowed peacekeepers to connect daily with Chinese citizens, 
provide them basic emergency training, and better support evacuation efforts if 
necessary.73 However, as of 2020, Chinese troops are still primarily located in Gao and 
their overall personnel numbers remain the same.74 
Doctrine and training. As revealed by China’s 2008 National Defense white 
paper, peacekeeping operations have become a military doctrine in and of itself.75 PKOs 
are one of seven pillars in Beijing’s military operations other than war (MOOTW). In the 
context of MINUSMA and UNMISS, the PLA has displayed three aspects of their 
peacekeeping doctrine and their ability to meet it. 
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Counterinsurgency doctrine. Interviews of Mali officials indicate that China is 
applying counterinsurgency doctrine by attempting to win hearts and minds. Mali Prime 
Minister Moussa Mara stated: “[The Chinese] understand that maintaining peace not only 
means weaponry and sending troops, but also means improving the livelihoods of locals. 
Chinese peacekeepers have won the hearts of the Malian people.”76 However, despite the 
public praise from officials, MINUSMA staff report Chinese peacekeepers lack 
knowledge in “the region’s background and in Mali’s various local languages,” which 
makes interaction with locals difficult.77  
China’s COIN operations are further defeated by the perception that they lack 
experience. An African diplomat stated: “China offers nothing better than France, [or] the 
US."78 A Ghanaian peacekeeper adds, “China is good at presenting its role in UNPKOs to 
win hearts and minds," but may not do it in practice.79 These statements suggest that 
Chinese peacekeepers lack the skills and/or experience to effectively carry out COIN 
operations.  
Restrained infantry. Despite Beijing’s strategy for protecting civilians with 
infantry troops, their driving principle of caution prevents Chinese troops from truly 
fulfilling their role or gain true combat experience. China is firm on self-determinism and 
does its best to refrain from meddling in other states’ affairs: “Soldiers are allowed to 
open fire only for self-defense purposes, and never take positions to help either party 
during a civil war.”80 Chinese infantry in Mali are particularly limited and only tasked 
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with force protection of the UN super camp in Gao. They are “not engaged in major 
combat operations.”81 
 As others note, Beijing’s caution for entangling in the affairs of other nations is 
exacerbated by their fear of domestic pushback. The death of two peacekeepers in South 
Sudan and one peacekeeper in Mali in 2016 restricted their involvement: "Dutch 
peacekeepers assessed that the Chinese were more cautious than proactive, especially 
after sustaining a casualty in 2016. In response to the fatality, the Chinese limited their 
patrols to the immediate Gao area.”82 The deaths apparently “re-opened” discussion in 
the Ministry of National Defense of whether peacekeeping was worth the cost.83 
Although Beijing has not substantially decreased troops after 2016, it also has not 
increased its footprint since 2015 (see Figure 2).  
Force Protection and Stabilization Patrols. The PRC’s mission in MINUSMA 
and UNMISS is to protect UN camps and citizens, as well as provide stabilization patrols 
in the local community. China proudly reports the statistics of its infantry troops in its 
2020 whitepaper, China's Armed Forces: 30 Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations: “As 
of August 2020, [UNMISS] battalions had completed 51 long-range and 93 short-
distance patrols, 314 armed escorts, and over 30,000 hours of patrols in weapons-free 
zones.”84 China notes this has improved their “responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, 
coordination of military emergency command systems and ability to conduct military 
 
81 Bayes, China’s Growing Security Role in Africa: Views from West Africa, Implications for Europe. 
82 McDonnell, Cooperation, Competition, or Both? Options for U.S. Land Forces vis-à-vis Chinese 
Interests in Africa. 
83 Fung, "Providing for Global Security: Implications of China’s Combat Troop Deployment to UN 
Peacekeeping."  
84 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China's Armed Forces: 30 
Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations. 
 
  25 
operations other than war at home.”85 Despite what the PRC has reported, others note that 
lack of training and experience has hindered their ability to carry out effective force 
protection and stabilization patrols. 
Figure 2. Timeline of Chinese Troop Contributions and Selected Events 
 
 
One report indicates that “several non-Chinese MINUSMA staff viewed the 
Chinese contingent as not combat-ready."86 This was put on display when fighting broke 
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out in Juba, South Sudan in 2016. Chinese peacekeepers abandoned their defensive posts, 
retreating to interior UN facilities.87  It was reported that “PRC troops showed a general 
unwillingness to provide protection.”88 “An eyewitness later described the Chinese 
reaction to the chaos within the UN House as slow, timid, and inexperienced."89 “They 
left their tanks, they left their guns, they left their ammunition—they were just 
running.”90 The UN incident report concluded that Chinese peacekeepers underperformed 
in their mission to protect civilians and guard the UN base. 
Command and Control. Accounts document an inflexible command chain that 
hinders operational effectiveness. For China, “exercising caution and paying attention to 
chain of command is very important.”91 However, “slow processing times from the 
Chinese contingent” not only prevented successful reaction to emergencies, but they were 
also unable to improvise when required.92 Despite their risk-averse decision making, their 
deference to command and control is also admired. 
 Chinese peacekeepers are “praised by many” for their discipline.93 “To date, there 
have been no allegations of misconduct by PRC peacekeepers, which puts China in a 
small segment of contributing states with untarnished national reputations."94 Overall, the 
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accounts of Chinese command and control paints troops as hardworking and disciplined 
but lacking the necessary ingenuity and discretion to carry out the mission. 
Civil-military relations. The authoritarian nature of the PRC regime means that 
civil and military entities are effectively the same, and so the level of access to one 
another is great. Civil bodies decide military decisions, and in the case of peacekeeping, 
it works to the military’s advantage. President Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission, offers tremendous support to the Ministry of National Defense 
Peacekeeping Affairs Center (the title was upgraded from the Peacekeeping Affairs 
Office in 2018).95 He announced six resolutions to bolster Chinese peacekeeping in 2015:  
1. China will build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops and join the 
new UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness System; 
2. China will give favorable consideration to UN requests for additional Chinese 
infantry, engineering, transportation, and medical staff; 
3. China will train 2,000 peacekeepers from other countries at their UN training 
facilities; 
4. China will provide $100 million in military aid to the AU to support the 
building of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crisis; 
5. China will send the first peacekeeping helicopter squad to UN PKOs in 
Africa;  
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6. China will establish a 10-year, $1 billion China-UN Peace and Development 
Fund, part of which will be used to support UN PKOs.96 
Xi Jinping’s level of support for peacekeeping demonstrates a positive relationship 
between civil and military affairs.  
Foreign military-to-military relations. The Chinese have cultivated robust 
partnerships with African militaries. This is exemplified by the 50 African countries that 
attended their 2018 China-Africa Defense and Security Forum, and a similar showing at 
their 2019 Peace and Security Forum. The content of the conferences was similar, but the 
title of the forum was slightly altered in 2019.97  
Both Malian and South Sudanese officials attended the forums with positive 
remarks. Mali Major General Idrahima Dahirou Demebele said, “This forum has 
significantly changed our perspective on China. We are close to China, both culturally 
and historically, and in facing of the challenges."98 The South Sudanese Chief of Staff 
commented: “China helped South Sudan to build a road that runs across the country, 
which largely improves the traffic conditions in South Sudan."99 The level of attendees 
and their consistent participation over the years demonstrates strong African partners. 
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Additionally, Mali, like many other African countries, has requested bilateral 
training initiatives from China.100 China boasts of its 20 training programs delivered to 
over 1,500 peacekeepers, as well as its education exchanges at China’s National Defense 
University.101 RAND reports that every African army “has at least one colonel or 
brigadier general who graduated from this university.”102 However, RAND also reports 
that the perception of the quality of education is still inferior to Western military 
universities: “The personnel with the highest promotion potential are still sent to Western 
academies.”103 
Although peacekeeping operations have greatly assisted China-Africa 
relationships, they have not assisted partnerships with the West. This is due to prejudice 
on both sides, as neither China nor the West integrates well in PKOs. Western delegates 
are skeptical of Chinese “independence and secrecy” while Chinese peacekeepers are 
observed interacting with developing countries more than Western nations because of 
“political reasons.”104 For further information, see Intelligence Collection subsection 
below. 
Capacity for innovation. Evidence that China is using peacekeeping to innovate 
its technology and warfighting capability is mixed. One source indicates China may use 
PKOs to test UAV and surveillance radar, however, this claim is not corroborated.105 No 
other data indicates that China is using PKOs to test and develop defense equipment. 
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China does appear to use PKOs to collect intelligence, and they could be aiding 
technology development by exploiting collected intelligence. 
Intelligence Collection and Foreign Partners. The data suggests that China is 
using peacekeeping operations to both collect intelligence and develop relationships with 
African intelligence entities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports that 
Chinese peacekeeping has opened “avenues for intelligence collection.”106 The Swedish 
Defense Research Agency writes of peacekeeping: “US military observers have 
categorically assumed their Chinese counterparts to be either political or intelligence 
officers.”107 It thus seems plausible that China is using PKOs to advance its technology 
and warfighting capability through intelligence collection. 
China also appears to be developing intelligence systems with PKO partners. PRC 
representatives to the UN helped draft the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook 
and call for “comprehensive UN solutions to strengthen information collection and 
sharing.”108 China is also working to strengthen bilateral intelligence exchange with the 
members of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOFAC), and assist African 
security officials in their sharing and exchange with INTERPOL.109 Therefore, collection 
and information sharing indicates a capability for innovation, even if it is unknown 
whether or not they have indeed innovated using the information collected. 
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Domestic Propaganda Machine. One factor holding China back from increasing 
its warfighting capability and gaining combat experience is its fear of domestic anguish 
over peacekeeping fatalities. As mentioned previously, Chinese peacekeepers are 
hamstrung by risk-averse leaders and little combat experience. It appears that China is 
ramping up its domestic-facing propaganda to herald the strength of its soldiers and the 
importance of the mission they are upholding. A few examples of propaganda include the 
PLA-produced “Chinese Blue Helmet in Operation” (2017), the Ministry of Defense 
Peacekeeping Affairs Office-produced television series, “Chinse Peacekeepers” (2012), 
and the state-sponsored film “Blue Defensive Line” (2020). The trailer of the latter film 
sports dramatic music and gunfire as Chinese peacekeepers run to aid a vehicle hit by a 
shell. A soldier clad in his uniform and the UN blue helmet says: “No one would abandon 
their posts.”110 “Blue Defensive Line” happened to be released on the same day the PRC 
published their September 2020 white paper on peacekeeping entitled, “China’s Armed 
Forces: 30 Years of UN Peacekeeping.”111 It thus appears that China is attempting to win 
domestic support, alter the narrative of Chinese soldiers fleeing their posts, and 
potentially, set the stage for future PKO involvement. 
Discussion 
 China’s participation in UN peacekeeping positively correlates with its 
advancement in military capability. As participation in MINUSMA and UNMISS have 
increased or diversified, particularly in regard to the addition of infantry troops, the 
Chinese military has increased its strategic resources and conversion capability. Although 
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this study demonstrated that there is an overall increase, it did not support commonly 
cited reasons for Chinese involvement in peacekeeping such as technology testing and 
gaining combat experience. Instead, PKOs provide China with justification to raise troops 
and develop infrastructure, thus increasing their strategic resources. PKOs also provide 
logistical experience, military-to-military relationships, and benign cover for intelligence 
collection that increase China’s ability to convert resources into actual military operations 
(conversion capability). This study concludes that Chinese participation in MINUSMA 
and UNMISS moderately effects China’s overall military capability (See Figure 3). 
Hypothesis 1: Strategic resources. Chinese participation in MINUSMA and 
UNMISS has moderately increased China’s strategic military resources, thus confirming 
Hypothesis 1. Peacekeeping operations have created the opportunity for the PLA to 
Figure 3. Findings- How UN peacekeeping effects China’s military capability. 
 
expand and grow their personnel and infrastructure. Despite Xi Jinping’s call to reduce 
the Chinese military by 300,000 personnel in 2015, he promised the UN a rapid response 
unit of 8,000 PLA peacekeepers in the same year. Raising the rapid response force 
despite the overall cuts indicates the peacekeepers are the same personnel deemed critical 
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to the PLA, and demonstrates China is using peacekeeping as an excuse to train and 
equip their regular ground forces. Furthermore, by way of comparison to the 
approximately 2,548 troops China has deployed to UN missions around the world in 
2020, the 8,000-manned force would triple their peacekeeping manpower.112 
Peacekeeping was also determined to significantly affect China’s military 
infrastructure capability. The MOOTW mission provided Beijing a valid excuse to build 
its first oversees base in Djibouti. As representatives have stated, China required a 
regional logistics base to stage its counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief 
efforts. The Djibouti base represents China’s intention to divorce their “keeping a low 
profile” policy and embrace their responsibilities of a world power. The base is a staging 
point into Africa and the Middle East and demonstrates China’s growing logistical 
requirements derived from their overseas operations. Furthermore, a Chinese naval 
commander stated that Djibouti is “just the first step,” indicating that increased 
requirements for peacekeeping may warrant further building of installations.113  
Increased participation in UN peacekeeping provided China a basis to upgrade its 
peacekeeping training center and fund the AU’s African Centre for the Study and 
Research on Terrorism. They prefer to support peacekeeping training in Chinese facilities 
or with bilateral donations, indicating that they prefer to put their own brand on 
peacekeeping. This is also evidenced by their lack of funding for major international 
peacekeeping training centers in Mali and Ghana. Peacekeeping is assessed to have a 
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moderate effect on China’s CRDT&E infrastructure due to limited evidence that the 
upgrades and increased funding significantly changed China’s military capability.  
Experience in PKOs may be a source of learning for China in regard to its defense 
industrial base. There was limited data on China’s private corporations, but a UN 
assessment did reveal Beijing’s 2014 involvement in arms sales in South Sudan. The 
backlash from this incident is likely to have prompted caution in China’s equipment 
donations to Mali, which only consisted of transport vehicles. China further tightened its 
grip over the private sector with the 2019 National Security law, which mandated private 
corporations to assist the government in national security matters. Although it is unlikely 
peacekeeping is the only factor driving this learning, it is one instance where 
peacekeeping may have helped shape military advancement. Without being able to 
determine a direct effect from peacekeeping, China’s defense industrial base was rated as 
moderate. 
Finally, peacekeeping was found to have minimal effect on China’s warfighting 
inventory and budget. Beijing equips its peacekeepers well, but they likely would have 
invested in standard issue equipment regardless of PKOs. Due to lack of data, it is also 
unknown how peacekeeping effects China’s overall defense budget. Peacekeeping is, 
therefore, deemed to have minimal effect on both categories.  
Hypothesis 2: Conversion capability. MINUSMA and UNMISS were found to 
have a moderate effect on Chinese conversion capability, thus confirming Hypothesis 2. 
This study found that despite combat experience being a commonly cited reason for 
Chinese participation in PKOs, logistics experience is a better description for what the 
PLA learns through peacekeeping. The Threats and Strategy measure illuminated that 
 
  35 
China receives little real combat experience over the course of their PKO participation 
due to their risk-adverse strategy. Additionally, out of the 915,000 active duty PLA 
officers, China only deployed 10,597 troops to MINUSMA and UNMISS from 2010 to 
2020.114 Assuming that all troops deployed to the two missions experienced combat in 
their deployment, this would mean that at most one percent of PLA officers gained 
combat experience. The Threats and Strategy measure is deemed to have significant 
effect on China’s conversion capability, however, because of the logistics experience 
China receives from PKOs.  
Their decision to open a logistics base in Djibouti shortly after they increased 
troops in MINUSMA and UNMISS demonstrates learning and an ability to convert 
resources into effective operations. In order to deploy battalions year after year, the PLA 
must fine tune its transportation routes, port debarkation, lines of communication, means 
for sustaining forces long term, and more.115 The PLA could easily scale up and apply the 
logistics lessons to other conflicts, especially if the conflict was in reach of the already 
established camp in Djibouti. As an old military proverb says, “amateurs study 
tactics…but professionals study logistics,” and thus, logistics learning is weighted 
significantly for the Threats and Strategy measure.116 
Doctrine and Training was assessed to have minimal effect on Chinese conversion 
capability because of the lack of advancement seen in MINUSMA or UNMISS. Both 
PKOs have demonstrated faults in Chinese doctrine and training, from COIN operations 
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to officers’ ability to stand post. This research did not find evidence that China was 
attempting to modify their doctrine or training despite these lessons learned, and thus 
peacekeeping was deemed to have limited effect on this capability. 
Similarly, Command and Control is assessed to have minimal effect on Chinese 
conversion capability. Activities in MINUSMA and UNMISS demonstrated China’s slow 
and ineffective response times to emergency situations. With no data indicating China 
will or has innovated its command and control, peacekeeping is deemed to have minimal 
effect on their command and control. 
The same assessment is made for Civil-Military Relations. PRC officials mandate 
the activities of PKOs as they would with any defense decision. Peacekeeping does not 
affect this relationship, rather maintains the status quo. Thus, peacekeeping was deemed 
to have minimal effect on civil-military relations.  
Foreign military-to-military relations, on the other hand, were significantly 
affected by peacekeeping because PKOs provided China a legitimate reason to cross-train 
with other nations, meet and educate African military officers, and collaborate with the 
AU to resolve regional conflict. China could conduct these activities without participating 
in UN PKOs, but as seen with the name change in their defense forum– from the 2018 
Defense and Security Forum to the 2019 Peace and Security Forum– peacekeeping 
allows China to present itself as a responsible world power and one that invests in more 
than the economy. Comments from the Major General in Mali demonstrate that China 
successfully sells this message of peace through its forums. 
Capacity for Innovation was assessed to have significant effect on conversion 
capability due to China’s increased access to intelligence collection and foreign partner 
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building. A known Chinese strategy for military advancement is intellectual property 
theft.117 In Mali, China has the potential to collect on Western technology such as British 
heavy lift helicopters and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capabilities. Additionally, China has the ability to observe France’s Operation Barkhane 
and Dutch and Swedish long-range patrols.118 The opportunity for China to benignly be 
in proximity to Western operations in MINUSMA is something it can find in few other 
places in the world. Furthermore, the need for information sharing with participating 
PKO nations gives China an opportunity to expand its foreign intelligence partners. 
These two factors of peacekeeping significantly effect China’s capacity to innovate its 
technology and warfighting abilities. 
Limitations of the current study. Transparent and abundant data was lacking in 
certain categories of military capability. Particularly, data was less commonly reported 
for day-to-day operations where peacekeepers did their job compared to reporting on 
poor performance. Additionally, conflicting accounts between peacekeepers and official 
Chinese reports exhibited potential credibility problems in the data. All data was included 
and weighted for credibility.  
Another limitation of the findings is the unknown direction of causality. An 
equally valid conclusion is that Beijing’s commitment to military development leads to 
PKO development as much or more than the reserve statement. President Xi Jinping 
committed to becoming a “world-class” military by 2049.119 The strength of this study, 
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however, is that it illuminates which specific capabilities will be further advanced by 
China’s continued or increased investment in PKOs. For example, increased Chinese 
PKO participation will likely result in increased infrastructure in the region. 
Peacekeeping operations were also found to increase their capacity to collect intelligence. 
The opportunity for robust collection on Western operations and technology may direct 
where future Chinese peacekeeping investments go. 
Conclusions  
 This study finds evidence that Chinese participation in UN PKOs increases its 
military capability in five ways. Peacekeeping gives China an excuse to develop strategic 
resources by providing the circumstances to invest in manpower and overseas 
infrastructure. Additionally, PKO’s allow the PLA to improve its conversion capability 
by honing its logistics processes, improving and expanding foreign military-to-military 
relationships, and providing means for intelligence collection. Moreover, peacekeeping 
provides an opportunity for China to conduct activities that fall below the threshold of 
international alarm.  
Readily defined by China as a MOOTW capability, peacekeeping is the perfect 
opportunity to advance military capability without naming an adversary or entering a 
conflict. PKO deployments fall in line with DIA’s assessment that China seeks to “pursue 
development without a major military conflict,” or in Xi Jinping’s words, “making 
progress while maintaining stability.”120 This study corroborates that peacekeeping 
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moderately advances China’s goal of becoming a “world-class” military power by 2049 
without the requirement of an actual military conflict. 
 By comparison, however, China is still far from outpacing American military 
capabilities. Purely in terms of infrastructure, the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) oversees 29 outposts, compared to China’s one installation in Djibouti.121 
Although the PLA dwarfs U.S. Army active duty officers by approximately 430,000 
personnel, the United States’ two decades of combat and logistical experience in the 
Global War on Terror is far superior.122 Due to the rarity and nature of peacekeeping 
missions, Chinese participation in PKOs will not be enough to outpace a military power 
like the United States. PKOs should be acknowledged as one factor advancing the 
Chinese military, specifically the PLA, but much greater efforts are needed to make a 
substantial capability difference. 
 Lastly, this study revealed that China is also attempting to innovate the military 
capabilities of UN PKOs. This is evidenced by their commitment to deploy the first full 
infantry battalion and to create the rapid response force consisting of UAV, helicopter, 
and surface ship operators. China’s novel approach to PKOs warrants further research 
into what the PRC gains from advancing UN peacekeeping capabilities. If they lead the 
charge on new technology and operations, will other nations follow to become 
interoperable? Does an increase in Chinese troop presence effectively transfer military 
operations with Chinese characteristics? With China’s recent separation from non-
 
121 Nick Turse, "Pentagon's Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa Contradicts its Claim of 'Light' Footprint," 
The Intercept, February 27, 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/02/27/africa-us-military-bases-africom/. 
122 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win.; U.S. 
Department of Defense, "DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications," Defense Manpower Data 
Center, August 2020, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. 
 
  40 
interference policies and their rapid quest for military power, continued research in this 
area is needed to keep pace with their military achievements around the world. 
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